



HOW SAUSAGE IS MADE: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND LOBBYING 
DANIEL P. TOKAJI† & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE‡ 
“Laws are like sausages, it is better not to see them being made.” 
–Attributed to Otto von Bismarck, probably mistakenly1 
INTRODUCTION 
The constitutional law governing campaign finance regulation is back up 
for grabs. The late Justice Antonin Scalia was an unwavering member of the 
U.S. Supreme Court majority that cast a skeptical eye on all forms of 
campaign finance regulation, save disclosure requirements. His death leaves 
the remaining Justices sharply and evenly divided on the crucial question of 
what government interests may justify campaign finance regulation. In 
addition to Justice Scalia, the other justices who made up the majority—Chief 
Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—take the position 
that the only acceptable justification for restricting campaign contributions and 
expenditures is to prevent the appearance or reality of corruption that stems from 
the quid pro quo exchange of money for a political benefit.2 By contrast, the 
dissenters—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—understand 
corruption in a broader sense, one that includes the superior access and 
influence that big donors and spenders may enjoy.3 
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1 Steven Luxenberg, A Likely Story . . . and That’s Precisely the Problem, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 
2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/16/AR2005041600154_pf.html 
[https://perma.cc/3BVC-N5RZ]. 
2 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 345, 356-61 (2010). 
3 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466-68 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the anticorruption definition relied on by the majority does not take into account corruption “that 
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If the Court is to embrace equality as a rationale for restricting the flow 
of campaign dollars, it will require empirical research on how the current 
system is actually functioning. Since Citizens United v. FEC, independent 
expenditures have increased dramatically at the federal level, in terms of both 
the total amount spent and the number of groups engaged in such spending.4 
Yet relatively little is known about how this influx of outside spending affects 
the process of governance. Our 2014 report The New Soft Money: Outside 
Spending in Congressional Elections explored these topics,5 but much more work 
remains to be done. 
What became abundantly clear to us over the course of researching The 
New Soft Money is that the money flowing into election campaigns is only half 
the story. To understand its real-world impact, one must also understand 
lobbying. For it is through the legislative and administrative process that 
interest groups are able to pass government policies that benefit those who 
donate to election campaigns. If campaign contributions and expenditures are 
where an investment is made, then lobbying is where the payoff occurs. To 
understand the current system of campaign finance, including the inequalities 
of access and influence endemic to this system, we must also understand how 
our lobbying system works.6 
We would therefore disagree with Bismarck, were he actually responsible 
for the sausages quotation. At this crossroads moment in the history of 
campaign finance regulation, it is essential to understand how sausages—by 
which we mean laws—are made. This requires engaging in careful study of 
the relationship between what happens at the front end of the political 
process, when campaign contributions and expenditures are made, and at the 
back end, when the lobbying takes place. The remainder of this Essay sets 
forth guidance on what that might mean for future researchers. First, we 
review the theoretical concern that disparities in wealth cause inequalities of 
political access and influence. Second, we discuss—based largely upon our 
experience in writing The New Soft Money—the practical problems inherent 
 
can destroy the link between public opinion and governmental action” and therefore is not consistent 
with the Constitution). 
4 See DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE 
SPENDING IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 35 fig.4 (2014) [hereinafter TOKAJI & STRAUSE, THE 
NEW SOFT MONEY] (highlighting that third-party expenditures for “express advocacy” for 
congressional campaigns increased from $200 million in 2010 to $450 million in 2012). 
5 See id. at 60-104 (exploring how outside spending affects how campaigns are run and 
legislation is passed). 
6 Several authors have focused on the relationship between campaign finance and lobbying. See 
generally Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 105 (2008); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 191, 213-16 (2012); Heather Gerken, Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, Keynote Address 
(Nov. 12, 2011), in 27 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 1155 (2011). 
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in assessing the extent to which this theory manifests in reality, given the 
ubiquity of money in both electoral campaigns and lobbying. Third, we propose 
specific research projects that might address this empirical difficulty and 
which would reveal how wealth disparities affect elections and governance. 
I.  THE THEORY: WHY MONEY MIGHT MATTER 
For decades, scholars have debated the theories that might be used to 
justify restrictions on expenditures and contributions.7 Countless gallons  
of ink have been spilled on the question of whether the better justification  
for such limits are based on anticorruption or egalitarian grounds, as  
well as the different ways of defining these values. The Roberts Court has 
narrowly defined the permissible basis for regulation. On the other hand,  
pro-regulatory scholars have advanced broader rationales for limiting the flow 
of money into political campaigns, some sounding in equality8 and others in 
anticorruption.9 
The only justification that the Supreme Court allows for restricting the 
flow of money into political campaigns is to prevent the reality and 
appearance of corruption. Following Burger and Rehnquist Court precedent, 
most notably Buckley, the current Roberts Court has rejected equality as a 
rationale that may justify restrictions on contributions or expenditures. The 
Roberts Court’s primary difference from its predecessors is its narrow 
definition of corruption, which it understands to be limited to the quid pro 
quo exchange of money for political benefits. Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission is only the most highly publicized example of the Court’s 
 
7 For a summary of this debate, see generally Renata E. B. Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji, Between 
Access and Influence: Building a Record for the Next Court, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 179 
(2014) [hereinafter Strause & Tokaji, Between Access and Influence]. 
8 See e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 186-89 (2016) (arguing that another 
progressive Supreme Court justice is a solution which could undo the “disruption that the Court’s 
[current anticorruption] campaign finance jurisprudence has done to . . . democracy”); Edward B. 
Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1204, 1206 (1994) (advocating for a requirement of “equal-dollars-per-voter” instead of the Supreme 
Court’s current prohibition of this principle). 
9 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: THE CORRUPTION OF EQUALITY AND THE 
STEPS TO END IT (2015) (describing the risk to U.S. democracy that results from a corrupt system 
that does not recognize an equality of citizenship for all Americans); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On 
Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 338 (1989) 
(“What is controversial is not whether corrupt practices should be condemned, but whether certain 
practices should be regarded as corrupt.”); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 341, 398 (2009) (finding the anticorruption principle as held by the Founder’s is 
an important guiding principle for constitutional interpretation). 
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restrictive approach toward regulation.10 In its first decade, the Roberts 
Court: 
 struck down one state’s limits on individual contributions and 
expenditures as too low,11 
 rejected federal restrictions on electioneering communications, 
except where they can only be reasonably understood as an appeal 
to vote for or against a candidate,12 
 disallowed Congress from increasing contribution limits for 
candidates facing a wealthy, self-financed opponent,13 
 struck down the federal ban on independent expenditures from 
corporate treasury funds,14 
 invalidated a state initiative that provided public funding based on 
the private contributions and expenditures favoring privately 
financed opponents,15 
 summarily rejected a state ban on corporate independent 
expenditures,16 and 
 struck down a decades-old federal law limiting aggregate 
contributions to all candidates, parties, and political committees.17 
Throughout this period, five Justices have been unequivocally hostile to 
all forms of campaign finance regulation except for disclosure requirements. 
All but the first of these cases (Randall) were decided by a 5–4 margin and 
Justice Scalia was part of the majority in every one. The Roberts Court 
majority recognized only one acceptable interest that can justify restrictions 
 
10 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
11 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006) (holding that a Vermont statute limiting 
campaign expenditures and contributions was inconsistent with the First Amendment). 
12 See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) (per curiam) (vacating a 
lower court decision that upheld FEC’s application of the restrictions in the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act to “grassroots lobbying advertisements”). 
13 See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729, 744 (2008) (striking down a law that would allow new 
donation limits for “non-self-financing candidate” if their self-financed opponent raised more than 
$350,000 because it was “antithetical to the First Amendment”). 
14 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (arguing that a statutory 
limitation on independent expenditures by corporations was unconstitutional and would make 
“political speech a crime”). 
15 See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829 (2011) 
(finding no “sufficient justification” for an Arizona state law that provided additional matching funds 
to a publically funded candidate). 
16 Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). 
17 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448, 1462 (2014) (holding that aggregate limits on 
campaign donations prevent individuals from exercising “expressive and associational rights” 
without furthering the government’s interest in preventing corruption). 
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on campaign contributions or expenditures: corruption or its appearance. 
These justices define corruption narrowly, as consisting of only the quid 
pro quo exchange of money for political benefits.18 The dissenting 
justices—Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan—have taken a more deferential approach that is more generous in what 
constitutes an allowable rationale for campaign contribution or expenditure 
limitations.19 Although the dissenters have not expressly embraced equality 
as a justification for contribution or expenditure limits, they have come close, 
most notably in Davis v. FEC.20 The dissenting justices’ conception of 
corruption has egalitarian undertones insofar as they accept the proposition 
that the superior resources of wealthy donors and spenders may corrupt the 
political process by resulting in disparities of political influence. Following 
the Rehnquist Court’s opinion in McConnell v. FEC,21 a minority of justices 
declared disparities of access and influence as an acceptable reason for 
restricting the flow of money into political campaigns.22 
We favor the explicit recognition of equality as a value that may justify 
reasonable restrictions on both contributions and expenditures. There are, of 
course, many different conceptions of equality. We think the most compelling 
one is the principle sometimes referred to as “anti-plutocracy,”23 the idea that 
wealthy individuals and interest groups should not enjoy disproportionate 
influence in our democracy by virtue of their superior financial resources. 
That said, we do not believe that there is a major practical difference between 
the equality rationale we support and the broader anticorruption rationale 
supported by some scholars and judges. As one of the leading supporters of a 
broader anticorruption rationale recently acknowledged, both views 
ultimately rest on the idea that all of us are equal citizens whose voice in 
democracy ought not be determined by our wealth.24 
 
18 See id. at 1441 (“Any regulation must instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’ 
corruption or its appearance.”). 
19 See id. at 1466-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that anticorruption encompasses a broader 
interest in “maintaining the integrity of our public governmental institutions”). 
20 See 554 U.S. 724, 755 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(recognizing an interest in “reducing both the influence of wealth on the outcomes of elections, and 
the appearance that wealth alone dictates those results”). 
21 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
22 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1469-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Our cases have firmly established 
that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to 
curbing undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.”) 
23 See generally HASEN, supra note 8 (advocating for campaign finance regulations that promote 
equality instead of pushing the United States towards a plutocracy); Foley, supra note 8 (arguing for 
adoption of an equal-dollars-per-voter principle to create equal financial influence among votes). 
24 Lawrence Lessig, Frequently Asked Questions, LESSIG, https://lessig2016.us/faq/ [https://
perma.cc/AV7U-XPFV], (“I have come to see that the reason the system is ‘corrupt’ is because it 
denies a fundamental equality of citizens.”). 
228 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 164: 223 
The anticorruption-versus-equality debate has effectively reached its 
conclusion, at least as an academic matter. Whether one embraces the equality 
rationale or favors a broader anticorruption rationale, the basic idea is the 
same: the superior access and influence of wealthy interests can justify 
campaign finance regulation. This shared understanding of the justification 
for regulation affords reformers an opportunity to focus on a more pressing 
problem: demonstrating that the proposition that wealthy individuals and 
groups in fact do enjoy superior access and influence is indeed the reality. 
Advocates of reform should therefore set aside the theoretical debate in order 
to engage in an empirical assessment of the effects that present-day 
independent spending is actually having on elections and governance.25 Using 
both qualitative and quantitative tools, researchers should document what is 
actually happening on the ground. This evidence is essential not only to 
determine whether or not the theory (or theories) supporting regulation are 
actually based in reality, but to craft both the next generation of campaign 
finance reforms. 
II.  THE PROBLEM:  
DOCUMENTING DISPARITIES OF ACCESS AND INFLUENCE 
Most Americans intuitively sense that the money spent on campaigns 
affects public policy outcomes. According to a 2015 New York Times poll,  
fifty-five percent of respondents think candidates who win public office often 
promote policies that directly help the people and groups who donated money 
to their campaigns.26 The same poll found that sixty-six percent believe 
wealthy Americans have a greater chance of influencing the electoral process 
than other Americans.27 Intuition, however, is not enough to make a case. If 
disparities of access and influence are to be accepted as a rationale for 
campaign contribution or expenditure limits, courts will require evidence that 
they actually exist. 
Developing an evidentiary record to support the next generation of 
campaign finance regulation will be challenging for four reasons. First, it will 
require overcoming the presumption of stare decisis. For four decades since 
the Supreme Court decided Buckley v. Valeo, it has been the law that it is 
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment” to limit the voice of some in order 
 
25 By “governance,” we mean the impact of campaign contributions and expenditures on public 
policy, including legislation. As we have explained elsewhere, the analytic framework that the Court 
applied during the McConnell era allowed for consideration of campaign money’s influence on 
governance—in particular, the superior access and influence that soft money donors enjoyed. Strause 
& Tokaji, Between Access and Influence, supra note 7, at 196-210. 
26 Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html [https://perma.cc/P63T-RPFP]. 
27 Id. 
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to enhance the voice of others.28 A more tolerant approach to regulation will 
require the Court to overrule precedent, either by expressly adopting an 
equality rationale (the course we favor) or by broadening the definition of 
corruption to include disparities in access and influence, the course followed 
in Austin and McConnell.29 To overrule the presumption of stare decisis the 
volume of evidence that advocates will have to muster will be higher.30 
Second, there have been major changes in the world of campaign finance 
since the last generation of reform. When Congress adopted the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, its central concerns were the “soft money” 
flowing through the political parties and electioneering communications 
masquerading as “issue ads,” both of which were vehicles for evading federal 
contribution restrictions.31 The issues of today are quite different. Today’s 
central concern is the vastly increased amount of money flowing through 
groups other than the political parties in the form of independent 
expenditures,32 which we have termed “the new soft money.” 
Our research suggests that the new soft money functions quite differently 
from the old soft money.33 While both the old and the new soft money 
influence policy, they operate through different mechanisms. The old soft 
money was like a hundred-dollar bill slipped to the nightclub bouncer to pass 
through velvet ropes, a means by which wealthy interests could ensure that 
public officials’ doors would be open to their lobbying efforts. The new soft 
money is more like a menacing bulge in one’s jacket pocket. It is a threat that 
adverse consequences, in the form of independent spending against an 
incumbent legislator, will follow if a wealthy interest group’s lobbying 
demands are denied. Although The New Soft Money consistently found that 
this outside spending functions as a, usually implied, threat, much more 
research needs to be done to assess how outside campaign spending influences 
 
28 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam). 
29 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 149-50 (2003) (“Our cases have firmly established that 
Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing 
undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.”), overruled in 
part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990) (holding that Michigan’s limit on corporate political expenditures was 
narrowly tailored to prevent the undermining of the political process’s integrity), overruled by 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
30 Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“The justifications for the case system and stare decisis must rest upon the Court’s capacity, and 
responsibility, to acknowledge its missteps. It is our duty to face up to adverse, unintended 
consequences flowing from our own prior decisions.”). 
31 TOKAJI & STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY, supra note 4, at 13. 
32 Id. at 35. 
33 Id. at 2 (concluding that the reality of campaign financing has changed since prior Court 
decisions and statutory enactments). 
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policy in the current regime. The next section attempts to sketch out these 
research needs. 
Third, the relationship between campaign finance and lobbying needs to 
be studied more comprehensively. The difficulty in establishing this 
relationship arises from the pervasiveness of money in our political  
system—at both the front end (electing candidates) and the back end (making 
policy). As Professors Pam Karlan and Sam Issacharaoff famously 
hypothesized, political money is like water—when prevented from flowing in 
one direction, it will naturally flow in another.34 It is also like water in that it 
is a ubiquitous element in our political ecosystem, including both election 
campaigns and policy debates. Understanding the entire ecosystem is key to 
the success of reforms that seek to reduce inequalities of access and influence. 
For example, it is simply not enough to study the impacts of spending by 
“Super PACs” and non-profit organizations, reformers must understand how 
these new players relate to the old institutions of political parties and 
leadership PACs. Proponents of reform must understand that relationships 
between members of Congress and lobbyists are formed and maintained more 
subtly than simply providing direct campaign contributions. And the deepest 
possible dive must be taken into the legislative process, to illuminate 
congressional actions marked by low public salience and high donor demand. 
In short, reformers must prepare to paint a broad yet detailed picture of our 
campaign finance and lobbying systems to show how spending influences both 
elections and governance. 
Finally, an evidence-based approach to campaign finance reform must 
meet the challenge of showing that any future proposed restriction is 
appropriately tailored. Even if a court can be persuaded to adopt an equality 
rationale as a basis for regulation, proving the appropriate means–end fit will 
be no small burden.35 As such, the project of amassing evidence to support 
the regulation should begin long before litigation is filed, and even before 
legislation is considered. 
This leads to the most important question of all. What sort of research 
would reveal the impact that campaign spending is having on both elections 
and governance? As we have previously argued, the evidence that was offered 
in McConnell v. FEC provides a useful model.36 But it is essential to refine 
 
34 See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (“First, we think political money, like water, has to go somewhere. It 
never really disappears into thin air.”). 
35 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 166-74 (2003) (indicating that once the Court accepts 
the undue influence anticorruption rationale at the beginning, the tailoring of the challenged 
provision is then examined), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
36 TOKAJI & STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY, supra note 4, at 74-76 (exploring the 
evidence in the McConnell case that was relied upon to show the influence of “soft money”). 
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that model, if we are to assess how the current system is working. We now 
turn to specifics of what that research might look like. 
III.  THE SOLUTION:  
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND LOBBYING 
For those reformers that advocate for egalitarian campaign finance 
restrictions, the most urgent challenge is to gather detailed evidence 
regarding the effects of campaign spending on both elections and governance. 
Qualitative examinations regarding the impact of economic inequalities on 
policy outcomes are central to this research agenda. In other words, 
researchers should lay their theoretical disagreements aside, and focus their 
efforts on how the sausages are made. Relying on our experience in 
researching and writing The New Soft Money, below we offer our suggestions 
on what that research might look like. 
Our proposed agenda starts with conversations with legislators, preferably 
on the record. Researchers should ask legislators about their sources of 
information on particular issues and who they listen to as informal advisors. 
Do campaign donors play a role in raising issues to a legislator’s attention? If 
so, what relationship do donors have with the legislator’s process of gathering 
and sorting information in policymaking? Does the same hold true for donors 
who give not only to the legislator directly, but to institutional players such 
as Super PACs and parties? 
Researchers should also explore more fully a topic we touched on in The 
New Soft Money: threats of independent spending. Do legislators perceive 
there to be threats that outside money will be spent against them if they take 
certain positions? Are such threats ever made directly and if not, how are they 
communicated to the legislators? What about promises of help via 
independent spending? 
In addition to legislators, researchers should talk to major donors and 
small-dollar donors. Why do they choose to spend money on political 
campaigns? Is there a difference in motivation between low-dollar donors and 
high-dollar donors? Do they expect anything in return for their money and if 
so, what? Is there a difference between what is expected in return for a direct 
donation to a candidate and a donation to a Super PAC supporting just that 
one candidate? Do the donors receive “thank yous,” either officially or through 
back-channels, from the candidates for Super PAC donations? 
Lobbyists are another key source of information, whether on the record 
or off the record. Much like the novels by former CIA agents that illuminate 
the tools of spycraft, interviews with retired lobbyists may be a fertile starting 
ground for understanding the tricks of the trade for developing and 
maintaining relationships with legislators and their staffs. In particular, 
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lobbyists could be critical to understanding the relationship between 
fundraising and agenda-setting by committees, such as in the timing of 
donations relative to hearings on a particular regulated community. 
Along with lobbyists, other institutional players should be interviewed. 
Organizations that fund Super PACs and other vehicles for independent 
spending should be questioned. Are all dollars spent for ideological reasons 
or is there pressure from lawmakers to fund such efforts? Is spending money 
a necessary condition for having a seat at the policymaking table? 
Finally, researchers should talk to staff—both campaign and official—whenever 
possible. Even if conversations must be off-the-record to start, staff will often 
hold the keys to understanding how the flow of campaign money makes its 
way to governance. 
CONCLUSION 
 The above ideas are meant to be preliminary and suggestive, aimed at 
spurring debate and refinement. Our most important point, one on which we 
hope there will be general agreement, is that there is a pressing need for 
qualitative research on how increased outside spending affects both elections 
and governance. One lesson from our experience in writing The New Soft 
Money is that it can be very difficult to persuade insiders to open up, especially 
those who are wary of campaign finance reform. It is therefore important  
that researchers ask the right questions, and that legislators, staff, donors, 
 and major political players do their best to answer them. Finally, it is 
crucial—though extremely difficult in this hotly contested realm—that 
ideology not cloud methodology. Researchers who hypothesize, as we do, that 
economic inequalities cause inequalities of access and influence must strive 
to describe the world as it is, not simply as we would like it to be for the 
purpose of advancing our own policy agenda.  
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